MAXIMS
and
MORAL REFLECTIONS,

by the Duke de la Rochefoucault,
from the French.

Printed at the office of George Nicholson,
Ludlow.
Sold by T. Knott, 47, Lombard-street;
and Champante and Whitrow, 4, Jewry-street, Aldgate, London.
Anno 1799.

FRANCIS DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT,

Prince of Marsilac, Governor of Poitou,

was the son of Francis, the first duke of Rochefoucault, and distinguished himself on several occasions by his courage and prudence. He wrote two excellent works; the one a book of Maxims, and the other Memoirs of the Regency of Queen Anne of Austria. It was partly at the instigation of the beautiful duchess de Longueville, that the Duke de Rochefoucault engaged in the civil wars, in which he signalized himself, particularly at the battle of St. Antoine. Beholding one day a portrait of this lady, he wrote underneath it those two lines from the tragedy of Alcyoneus.

" Pour meriter son cœur, pour plaire a ses beaux yeux,
J' ai fait la guerre aux rois, je l' aurois fait aux deux."

" To gain her heart, and please her sparkling eyes,
I 've warr'd with kings, and would have brav'd the skies."

The author of the Maxims was not a member of the French Academy. The necessity of making a public speech the day of his reception was the only cause that he did not claim admittance. This nobleman, with all the courage he had displayed on various critical occasions, and with his superiority of birth and understanding over the common run of men, did not think himself capable of facing an audience, to utter only four lines in public, without being out of countenance. He died at Paris in 1680, aged 68.

" *Encyclopædia Britannica.*"

ADVERTISEMENT.

Uncommon talents, cultivated by a finished education, formed in the Duke de la Rochefoucault one of the brightest ornaments of the court in which he shone: honoured, in the highest degree, by his sovereign—celebrated by all who were capable of estimating true merit—in the army, signalized by zeal and bravery.—Thus generous and accomplished, he was eminently qualified to aspire to the glory of contributing to form the taste of the French nation, and to give it a true relish for propriety and correctness. "Tho'," says M. de Voltaire, "there is but one truth running through the whole of the Maxims, namely, that self-love is the spring of all our actions and determinations, yet this thought presents itself under such a variety of forms, as never fail to strike with new surprise. This little collection was much read and admired; it accustomed our authors to think, and to comprise their thoughts in a lively, correct, and delicate turn of phrase; which was a merit utterly unknown to any European writer before him, since the revival of letters His Memoirs"* are still read, and his "Maxims" *are known by heart.*"†

In the Earl of Chesterfield's Letters, we frequently view his Lordship both as an admirer and defender of our author. "La Rochefoucault is, I know, blamed," says his Lordship, "but, I think, without reason, for deriving all our actions from the source of self-love. For my own part, I see a great deal of truth, and no harm at all, in that opinion. It is sufficient that we

* Mem. d'Anne d'Autriche. † Siecle de Louis XIV.

seek our own happiness in every thing we do; and it is as certain that we can only find it in doing well and in conforming all our actions to the rule of right reason, which is the great law of nature. It is only a mistaken-self-love that is a blameable motive, when we take the immediate and indiscriminate gratification of a passion, or appetite, for real happiness. But am I blameable, if I do a good action on account of the happiness which that honest consciousness will give me? Surely not. On the contrary, that pleasing consciousness is a proof of my virtue," &c. &c.* Again: "Read in the morning some of La Rochefoucault's Maxims; consider them, examine them well, and compare them with the real characters you meet, in the evening." † "Till you come to know mankind by your own experience, I know no thing, nor no man, that can, in the mean time, bring you so well acquainted with them as Le Duc de la Rochefoucault. His little Book of Maxims, which I would advise you to look into, for some moments at least every day of your life, is, I fear, too like and too exact a picture of human nature. I own, it seems to degrade it, but yet my experience does not convince me that it degrades it unjustly "‡ To the amiable and excellent character of our illustrious author, the Marchioness de Sevigné bears abundant testimony. Speaking of him in his last illness, says this elegant writer, "He has not passed his life in making Reflections and Maxims to no purpose; he has thereby rendered death so familiar, that the aspect is neither new nor shocking."

* Letter 129. † Letter 225. ‡ Letter 273.

MAXIMS AND MORAL REFLECTIONS.

ABILITY.

1. The desire of appearing to be persons of ability often prevents our being so. 2. Some weak people are so sensible of their weakness, as to be able to make a good use of it. 3. The height of ability consists in a thorough knowledge of the real value of things, and of the genius of the age in which we live. 4. It requires no small degree of ability to know when to conceal one's ability. 5. Few men are able to know all the ill they do. 6. There are some affairs, and distempers, which ill-timed remedies make worse; and great ability is requisite to know when it is dangerous to apply them.

ACCENT.

7. The character of a man's native country is as strongly impressed on his mind, as its accent is on his tongue.

ACCIDENTS.

8. No accidents are so unlucky, from which the prudent may not draw some advantage; nor are there any so lucky, which the imprudent may not turn to their prejudice. 9. Accidents sometimes happen from which a man cannot well extricate himself without a spice of madness.

ACTIONS.

10. Those great actions whose lustre dazzles us, are

represented by politicians as the effects of deep design; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, generally attributed to their ambition to give a master to the world, was probably owing to jealousy only. 11. Men may boast of their great actions; but they are oftener the effect of chance, than of design. 12. Our actions would seem to be under the influence of good or bad stars, to which they owe great part of the praise or blame they meet with. 13. How brilliant soever an action may be, it ought not to pass for Great, when it is not the effect of great design. 14. There ought to be a certain proportion between our designs and actions, if we would reap from them all the advantages they might produce. 15. Our actions are like blank verse, which every one recites in his own manner. 16. We should often be ashamed of our best actions, if the world knew the real motives which produce them. 17. To praise great actions, is in some degree to share them.

ADVICE.

18. There is nothing of which we are so liberal as of advice. 19. Nothing is less sincere than the manner of asking, and of giving, advice. He who asks it would seem to have a respectful deference for the opinion of his friend; tho' he only aims at having his own approved of, and making his friend responsible for his conduct. On the contrary, he who gives it repays the confidence reposed in him by a seemingly disinterested zeal, tho' he seldom means any thing by the advice he gives but his own interest or reputation. 20. There is nearly as much ability requisite to know how to make use of good advice; as to know how to

act for one's self. 21. We may give advice; but we cannot give conduct.

AFFECTATION.

22. We are never made so ridiculous by the qualities we have, as by those we affect to have. 23. We had better appear to be what we are, than affect to appear what we are not.

AFFLICTION.

24. Interest and vanity are the usual sources of our afflictions, however specious may be our pretences to the contrary. 25. There are in affliction several kinds of hypocrisy. Under the pretence of bewailing the loss of a person who was dear to us, we weep for ourselves: we regret the good opinion the deceased had of us: we weep over the diminution of our fortune, of our pleasure, of our importance. Thus have the dead the honour of tears which stream only for the living. This is a kind of hypocrisy; because in this sort of affliction we impose on ourselves. There is another hypocrisy, which is less innocent, because it imposes on the world. This is the affliction of such as aspire to the glory of a great and immortal sorrow. When time, which consumes all things, has worn out the grief which they really had, they still persist in their tears, lamentations, and sighs. They assume a mournful behaviour; and labour by all their actions to demonstrate that their affliction will not in the least abate till death. This disagreeable trouble some vanity is common among ambitious women. As their sex bars all the paths to glory, they endeavour to render themselves remarkable by the ostentation of an inconsolable affliction. There is still another species of tears whose shallow springs easily overflow, and dry

away as easily. Some people weep in order to acquire the reputation of being tender; others weep in order to be pitied; others weep that they may be wept over; and some even weep to avoid the scandal of not weeping. 26. We sometimes lose friends whom we regret more than we grieve for; and others for whom we grieve, yet do not regret. 27. Most women lament not the death of their lovers so much out of real affection for them, as because they would appear worthy of having been beloved.

AGE.

28. Most people, as they approach old age, shew in what manner their mind and body will decay.

29. We arrive novices at the several ages of life; and often want experience, notwithstanding we have had years enow to learn it.

AGREEABLENESS.

30. We judge so superficially of things, that common words and actions, spoke and done in an agreeable manner, with some knowledge of what passes in the world, often succeed beyond the greatest ability.

31. We may say of agreeableness, as distinct from beauty, that it is a symmetry whose rules are unknown; it is a secret conformity of the features to one another, and to the complexion and air of a person.

AMBITION.

32. The ambitious deceive themselves in proposing an end to their ambition: that end, when attained, becomes a mean. 33. When great men suffer themselves to be subdued by the length of their misfortunes, they discover that it was the strength of their ambition, not of their understanding, which supported them; and that, allowing for a little vanity, heroes

are just like other men. 34. The greatest ambition entirely conceals itself, when it finds that what it aspired to is unattainable. 35. What seems to be generosity is often no more than a disguised ambition, which overlooks little interests in order to gratify great ones. 36. Moderation must not claim the merit of combating and conquering ambition; for they can never exist in the same subject. Moderation is the langour and sloth of the soul, as ambition is its activity and ardour. 37. We pass often from love to ambition; but we seldom return from ambition to love.

APPLICATION.

38. Those who apply themselves too much to little things, commonly become incapable of great ones. 39. Few things are impracticable in themselves; and it is for want of application, rather than of means, that men fail of success.

APPEARANCE.

40. In every profession, every one affects to appear what he would willingly be thought: so that we may say, The world is composed of nothing but appearances.

AVARICE.

41. Misers mistake gold for their good; whereas it is only a mean of attaining it. 42. Avarice is more opposite to economy than liberality. 43. Extreme avarice almost always makes mistakes. There is no passion that oftener misses its aim; nor on which the present has so much influence, in prejudice of the future. 44. Avarice often produces contrary effects. There are many people who sacrifice their whole fortunes to dubious and distant expectations; and

there are others who contemn great future for litt present advantages

BENEFITS.

45. We like better to see those on whom we con benefits, than those from whom we receive them

46 Men are not only apt to forget benefits and in ries, but even to hate those who have obliged the and to cease to hate those who have injured the The very attention to requite kindnesses, and reve wrongs, seems to be an insupportable slavery.

47. Every body takes pleasure in returning sm obligations; many persons even acknowledge moc ate ones; but there is scarcely any one who does repay great obligations with ingratitude.

BUSINESS.

48. The rust of business is sometimes polished in a camp; but never in a court.

CIVILITY.

49 Civility is a desire to receive civility, and t accounted well-bred.

CLEMENCY.

50. The clemency of princes is often but a stroke of policy to gain the affections of their subjects.

51. That clemency we make a virtue of proceed sometimes from vanity, sometimes from indolen often from fear, and almost always from a mixture all three.

CONDUCT.

52. That conduct often seems ridiculous, the sec reasons of which are wise and solid. 53. A m often imagines he acts, when he is acted upon while his mind aims at one thing, his heart insen gravitates towards another.

CONFIDENCE.

54. Confidence has a greater share in conversation than wit. 55. The desire of being pitied or admired, is commonly the true reason of our confidence. 56. Nothing flatters our pride more than the confidence of the great, because we look on it as the effect of our merit; not reflecting that it proceeds most frequently from their vanity, or inability to keep a secret; so that confidence is sometimes, as it were, the relief of the mind, which wants to ease itself of an oppressive load.

CONSTANCY.

57. The constancy of the wise is only the art of keeping their disquietudes to themselves. 58. We all bear the misfortunes of other people with an heroic constancy. 59. Criminals who are executed affect sometimes a constancy, and contempt of death, which is in fact nothing more than the fear of looking on it: so that their constancy may be said to be to the mind, what the fillet is to their eyes. 60. Constancy in love is perpetual inconstancy: it attaches us successively to all the good qualities of the person beloved, giving sometimes the preference to one, sometimes to another: so that this constancy is no more than inconstancy confined to one object. 61 In love, there are two sorts of constancy; one arises from our continually finding in the beloved object fresh motives to love; and the other proceeds from our making it a point of honour to be constant. 62. In misfortunes we often mistake dejection for constancy; and we bear them, without daring to look on them; as cowards suffer themselves to be killed without resistance.

CONTEMPT.

63. We sometimes condemn the present by praising the past; and shew our contempt of what now is, by our esteem for what is no more. 64. None but the contemptible are apprehensive of contempt.

CONVERSATION.

65. One reason why we meet with so few people who are reasonable and agreeable in conversation is, that there is scarcely any person who does not think more of what he has to say, than of answering what is said to him. Even those who have the most address and politeness think they do enough if they only *seem* to be attentive; at the same time that one might perceive in their eyes and their minds a distraction as to what is addressed to them, and an impatience to return to what they themselves were saying; not reflecting, that to be thus studious of pleasing themselves is but a poor way to please or convince others; and that to hear patiently, and answer precisely, are the great perfections of conversation.

COPIES.

66. The only good copies are those which point out the ridicule of bad originals.

COQUETRY.

67. It is a sort of coquetry, to boast that we never coquet. 68. All women are coquets, tho' all women do not practise coquetry: some are restrained by fear, others by reason. 69. Women are not aware of the extent of their coquetry. 70. Women find it more difficult to get the better of their coquetry than of their love. 71. The greatest miracle of love is the reformation of a coquet. 72. We are always afraid of appearing before the person we love when

we have been coquetting elsewhere. 73. Coquets take a pride in appearing to be jealous of their lovers, in order to conceal their being envious of other women.

CRIMES.

74. There are crimes which become innocent, and even glorious, through their splendor, number, and excess. Hence it is that public theft is called address; and to seize on provinces unjustly, to make conquests.

75. We easily forget crimes that are known only to ourselves. 76. There are people of whom we never believe ill till we see it: but there are none in whom we ought to be surprised to see it. 77. Those who are themselves incapable of great crimes do not readily suspect others of them.

CUNNING.

78. The greatest of all cunning is, to appear blind to the snares laid for us; men being never so easily deceived as while they are endeavouring to deceive others. 79. Those who have most cunning always affect to condemn cunning, that they may make use of it on some great occasion, and to some great end.

80. The common practice of cunning is a sign of a small genius: it almost always happens that those who use it to cover themselves in one place, lay themselves open in another. 81. Cunning and treachery proceed from want of capacity. 82. The sure way to be cheated is, to fancy ourselves more cunning than others. 83. The reason we are angry with those who trick us is, because they appear to have more wit than ourselves. 84. One man may be more cunning than another, but not more cunning than all the world.

85. Those who are deceived by our cunning do not

appear near so ridiculous to us, as we seem to ourselves when deceived by the cunning of others.

CURIOSITY.

86. There are two kinds of curiosity: one arises from interest, which makes us desirous to learn what may be useful to us; the other from pride, which makes us desirous to know what others are ignorant of.

DEATH.

87. Few people are well acquainted with death. It is generally submitted to through stupidity and custom, not resolution; and most men die merely because they cannot help it. 88. Death and the sun cannot be looked at steadily. 89. After having spoken of the falsity of seeming virtues, it is proper to say something about the falsity of the contempt of death: I mean that contempt of death which the heathens boasted to derive from their natural strength, unsupported by the hopes of a better life. There is a wide difference between suffering death courageously, and contemning it; the one is common enough, but the other, I believe never sincere. Every thing nevertheless has been written that can persuade us that death is no evil; and some of the weakest as well as the greatest of men have given numerous celebrated examples in confirmation of this tenet. Yet I doubt whether any person of good sense ever believed it; and the pains we take to persuade ourselves and others of it plainly evince that it is no easy task. A man may for many reasons be disgusted with life; but he can have no reason for contemning death. Even suicides esteem it no slight matter, and are as much startled at it, and decline it as much as other people, when it comes in any other shape than that they have chosen.

The remarkable inequality in the courage of many valiant men proceeds from death's appearing differently to their imaginations, and seeming more instant at one time than another. By these means it happens, that after having contemned what they did not know, they are at last afraid of what they do know. We must avoid considering death in all its circumstances, if we would not think it the greatest of all ills. The wisest and bravest are those who make the handsomest pretences for not considering it at all: for every one that views it in its proper light will find it sufficiently terrible. The necessity of dying made the whole of philosophic fortitude. The philosophers thought it best to do that with a good grace which they could not avoid doing; and, being unable to make themselves immortal, they did all they could to immortalize their reputations, and save what they might out of the general wreck. To be able to put a good face on the matter, let us by no means discover even to ourselves all we think about it; let us trust rather to our constitutions, than to those vain reasonings which make us believe we can approach death with indifference. The glory of dying resolutely, the hopes of being regretted, the desire of leaving a fair reputation, the assurance of being delivered from the miseries of life, and freed from the caprice of fortune, are alleviating reflections, not to be rejected: but we must by no means imagine them infallible. They serve indeed to embolden us, just as in war a poor hedge emboldens the soldiers to approach a place from which they are fired on. While at a distance, they believe it may shelter them; but when they come up, they experience it to be but a poor defence. We flatter ourselves too

much in fancy, that death, when near, will appe
what we judged it to be when distant; and that ou
opinions, which are weakness itself, will be firm
enough not to give way on this severest of all trial
We must be also but ill acquainted with the effects o
self-love, to imagine that that will permit us to thin
lightly of an action which must necessarily be its de
struction. Reason, too, from whom we expect suc
mighty assistance, is, on this occasion, not able t
make us believe what we wish to find true. On th
contrary, it is she who generally betrays us; and in
stead of inspiring a contempt of death, helps us onl
to discover its horrors. Indeed all she can do for u
is, to advise us to avert our eyes, and fix them on som
other object. Cato and Brutus chose noble ones.
footman, some time since, amused himself with danc
ing upon the scaffold he was going to be broken on
Thus different motives sometimes produce the sam
effect. And so true it is, that whatever disproportion
there may be between the Great and the Vulgar, we
often see them meet death with the same countenance
there is always this difference, however, that the con
tempt of death shewn by heroes is owing to their lov
of glory, which hides it from their sight; while in
common people it proceeds merely from their want of
sensibility, which prevents their being aware of th
greatness of the evil, and leaves them at liberty t
think of something else.

DECEIT.

90. We cannot bear to be deceived by our enemie
and betrayed by our friends; yet are we often con
tent to be served so by ourselves. 91. It is as eas
to deceive ourselves without *our* perceiving it, as it is

difficult to deceive others without *their* perceiving it.

92. A resolution never to deceive exposes a man to be deceived himself. 93. Dulness is sometimes a sufficient security against the attack of an artful man.

94. He who imagines he can do without the world deceives himself much; but he who fancies the world cannot do without him is still more mistaken.

95. In love, the deceit almost always outstrips the distrust. 96. We are sometimes less unhappy in being deceived, than in being undeceived by those we love. 97. When our friends have deceived us, we have a right to be indifferent to their professions of friendship; yet we ought always to retain a sensibility for their misfortunes.

DECENCY.

98. Decency is the least of all laws, but the most strictly observed.

DESIRE.

99. It is much easier to suppress a first desire than to satisfy those that follow it. 100. Before we passionately wish for any thing, we should examine into the happiness of its possessor. 101. We should never passionately desire any thing, if we were perfectly acquainted with the object of our desire.

DISGUISE.

102. If we took as much pains to *be* what we ought as we do to disguise what we *are*, we might appear like ourselves, without being at the trouble of any disguise at all. 103. We are so used to disguise ourselves to others, that at last we become disguised even to ourselves. 104. Some disguised falsehoods are so like truths, that it would be judging ill not to be deceived by them.

DISTRUST.

105. Our own distrust justifies the deceit of othe

106. That which commonly hinders us from shew ing the openness of our hearts to friends, is not much a distrust of them, as of ourselves. 107. Wha ever distrust we may have of the sincerity of som people, we always believe them to be more ingenuo with ourselves than with any body else.

EASE.

108. A man who does not find ease in himse seeks for it vain elsewhere.

EDUCATION.

109. The common education of young people stils into them a second self-love.

ELOQUENCE.

110. There is as much eloquence in the tone voice, in the look, and in the gesture of an orator in the choice of his words. 111. True eloquen consists in saying all that is proper, and nothing mo

EMPLOYMENT.

112. It is easier to appear worthy of the emplo ments we are not possessed of than of those we are.

113. We may appear great in an employment be low our merit; but we often appear little in one th is too high for us.

ENVY.

114. We love those who endeavour to imitate us much better than those who strive to equal us; for imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of en y.

115. We often glory in the most criminal passions; but the passion of envy is so shameful, that we ne dare to own it. 116. Jealousy is in some sort ra tional and just; since it only aims at the preservat

of a good which belongs, or which we at least think belongs, to us: whereas envy is a frenzy, that cannot bear the good of others. 117. Our approbation of those who are entering into the world, is often owing to a secret envy of those who are well settled in it. 118. Pride, which excites envy, often helps us also to moderate it. 119. Envy is more irreconcileable than hatred. 120. Envy is destroyed by true friendship, and coquetry by true love. 121. Our envy always outlives the felicity of its object. 122. There are more people free from interest, than from envy.

EXAMPLE.

123. Nothing is so contagious as example: never is any great good or ill done which does not produce its like. We imitate good actions through emulation; and bad ones through a malignity in our nature, which shame restrains, and example emancipates.

FAMILIARITY.

124. Familiarity is a suspension of almost all the laws of civility, which libertinism has introduced into society under the notion of ease.

FAVOURITES.

125. The hatred of favourites is nothing more than the love of favour. Our indignation at not possessing it ourselves is soothed and mitigated by the contempt we express for those who do; and we refuse them our homage, because we are not able to deprive them of that which procures them the homage of every one else.

FAULTS.

126. We need not be much concerned about those faults which we have the courage to own. 127. A

great genius will sincerely acknowledge both his defects and perfections; for it is a weakness not to own the ill as well as the good that is in us. 128. If we had no faults ourselves, we should not take pleasure in observing those of others. 129. We are often more agreeable through our faults, than through our good qualities. 130. There are people who are disagreeable with great merit; and others who with great faults are agreeable. 131 We acknowledge our faults, in order to repair by our sincerity the hurt they do us in the opinion of others. 132. Only great men have great faults. 133. Dishonest men conceal their faults from themselves as well as others; honest men know and confess them. 134. We confess small faults in order to insinuate that we have no great ones. 135. There are some faults, which, when well managed, make a greater figure than virtue itself. 136. We have not assurance enough to say in general that we have no faults, and that our enemies have no good qualities; but in particulars we seem to think so. 137. We have few faults which are not more excusable in themselves than the means we use to conceal them. 138. We boast of faults that are the opposites to those we really have: thus, if we are irresolute, we glory in being thought obstinate. 139. We easily excuse in our friends the faults which do not affect us. 140. We endeavour to acquire reputation by those faults we determine not to amend. 141. It seems as if men thought they had not faults enow, for they increase their number by certain affected singularities; which are cultivated so carefully, that at last they become natural defects, beyond their power to reform.

FEAR.

142. Few cowards know the extent of their fears.

FIDELITY.

143. The fidelity of most men is no more than an art of self-love to procure confidence. It is the means to raise us above others, by making us the depositaries of momentous concerns. 144. It is more difficult to be faithful to a mistress when on good terms with her, than when on bad.

FLATTERY.

145. We should have but little pleasure, were we never to flatter ourselves. 146. Did we not flatter ourselves, the flattery of others could never hurt us. 147. Flattery is a sort of bad money, to which our vanity gives currency. 148. Men sometimes think they hate flattery; but they hate only the manner of it.

FOLLY.

149. Folly attends us close through life; and if any one seems to be wise, it is merely because his follies are proportionate to his age and fortune. 150. He who lives without folly is not so wise as he imagines. 151. As we grow old, we grow more foolish and more wise. 152. It is great folly to affect to be wise by one's self. 153. Some follies resemble contageous distempers. 154. Old fools are more foolish than young ones. 155. There are people fated to be fools; and who not only commit follies by choice, but are even constrained to do so by fortune. 156. No fools are so troublesome as those who have some wit.

FORTUNE.

157. Whatever difference may appear in men's fortunes, there is nevertheless a certain compensation of

good and ill, which makes all equal. 158. Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favourites. 159. The happiness and misery of men depend no less on their temper than fortune.

160. Fortune breaks us of many faults, which reason cannot. 161. The generality of people judge of men by their reputation, or fortune. 162. To be great, we must know how to push our fortune to the utmost. 163. Fortune displays our virtues and vices, as the light shews objects. 164. Fortune never seems so blind as to those on whom she bestows no favours. 165. To be able to answer for our fortune, we should be able to answer for what we shall do. 166. We should manage our fortune like our constitution; enjoy it when good, have patience when it is bad, and never apply violent remedies but in cases of necessity. 167. Fortune and caprice govern the world.

FRIENDSHIP.

168. What is commonly called friendship is no more than a partnership; a reciprocal regard for one another's interests, and an exchange of good offices: in a word, it is a mere traffic, wherein self-love always proposes to be a gainer. 169. Tho' most of the friendships of the world ill deserve the name of friendships; yet a man may make use of them occasionally, as of a traffic whose returns are uncertain, and in which it is usual to be cheated. 170. In the distress of our best friends, we always find something that does not displease us. 171. The reason we are so changeable in our friendships is, that it is difficult to know the qualities of the heart, and easy to know those of the head. 172. We love nothing but on our own

account, and only follow our taste and inclination when we prefer our friends to ourselves: and yet it is this preference which alone constitutes true and perfect friendship. 173. It is more dishonourable to distrust a friend, than to be deceived by him.

174. We often imagine we love men in power; but interest alone is the true reason of our friendship for them: we espouse not their party to do them good, but from their hands to receive good. 175. Self-love magnifies, or diminishes, the good qualities of our friends, in proportion to the satisfaction we take in them; and we judge of their merit by the terms they keep with us. 176. We sometimes complain of our friends lightly in order to justify our own levity. 177. We are not much afflicted at the misfortunes of our friends, when they give us an opportunity of signalizing our affection for them. 178. When we exaggerate the love our friends bear us, it often proceeds less from a principle of gratitude, than the desire of prejudicing people in favour of our own merit. 179. We always love those who admire *us*; but we do not always love those whom *we* admire.

180. Rare as true love is, it is less so than true friendship. 181. The reason why few women give into friendship is, that friendship is insipid to those who have experienced love. 182. In friendship, as in love, we are often happier through our ignorance, than our knowledge. 183. It is difficult to love those we do not esteem; and it is no less difficult to love those whom we esteem much more than we do ourselves. 184. We are much nearer loving those who hate us, than those who love us more than we desire. 185. The greatest effort of friendship is,

not the discovery of our faults to a friend, but the endeavouring to make him sensible of his own.

186. The charm of novelty, and long habit, opposite as they are, equally conceal from us the faults of our friends. 187. The generality of friends put us out of conceit with friendship; as the generality of religious people put us out of conceit with religion.

188. Nothing is more natural, nor more fallacious than a belief that we are beloved. 189. Renewed friendships require more conduct than those that have never been broken.

GALLANTRY.

190. There are many women who have never had an intrigue; but there are scarcely any who have had no more than one. 191. Love is the smallest part of gallantry. 192. We seldom talk of a woman's first intrigue before she has had a second.

GLORY.

193. The glory of great men ought always to be rated according to the means used to acquire it.

194. We exalt the reputation of some, to depress that of others; nor should we always extol so much the Prince of Conde and Marshal Turenne, had we not an inclination to blame both. 195. It is as commendable to be proud with respect to one's self, as ridiculous to be so with respect to others. 196. We are unwilling to lose our lives, and yet we would fain acquire glory. Hence it is that the brave use more address to avoid death, than men versed in the laws do to preserve their estates.

GOODNESS.

197. Nothing is more rare than true goodness; even those who imagine they possess it having usually not

ing more than complaisance or weakness. 198. It is very difficult to distinguish diffusive general goodness from great address. 199. None deserve the name of good, who have not spirit enough, at least, to be bad; the goodness of other people being for the most part but indolence or impotence. 200. A fool has not stuff enough to make a good man.

201. Resolute people alone can be truly good-natured; such as commonly seem so are weak and easily soured.

GOOD SENSE.

202. Good sense should be the test of all rules, both ancient and modern: whatever is incompatable with good sense is false.

GOVERN.

203. It is more difficult to prevent being governed, than to govern others.

GREAT MEN.

204. Since great men cannot bestow health of body nor peace of mind, we certainly pay too dear for all that they can bestow.

GRAVITY.

205. Gravity is a mysterious carriage of the body, invented to cover the defects of the mind.

GRACE.

206. A good grace is to the body what good sense is to the mind.

GREEDINESS.

207. An able man will arrange his interests, and conduct each in its proper order. Our greediness often hurts us, by making us prosecute so many things at once: by too earnestly desiring the less considerable, we lose the more important.

GRATITUDE.

208. It is with gratitude as with honesty among traders, it helps to carry on business; and we pay, not because we ought, but to find easier credit another time. 209. Not all who discharge their debts of gratitude should flatter themselves that they are grateful. 210. The reason of the misreckoning in expected returns of gratitude is, that the pride of the giver and receiver can never agree about the value of the obligation. 211. There is a certain warmth of gratitude which not only acquits us of favours received, but even while we are paying our friends what we owed, makes them our debtors. 212. The gratitude of most men is only a secret desire to receive greater favours.

HAPPINESS.

213. None are either so happy or so unhappy as they imagine. 214. We take less pains to be happy, than to appear so. 215. Happiness is in the taste, not in the thing; and we are made happy by possessing what we ourselves love, not what others think lovely.

HATRED.

216. When our hatred is violent, it sinks us even beneath those we hate.

HEART.

217. Every body speaks well of his heart, but no one dares to speak well of his head. 218. The head is always the dupe of the heart. 219. Those who are well acquainted with their head, are not always so with their heart. 220. The head cannot long act the part of the heart. 221. The imagination cannot invent so many contrarieties as are naturally in the heart of man.

HEROES.

222. Whatever great advantages Nature may give, she cannot make heroes without the concurrence of fortune. 223. There are heroes in ill, as well as in good.

HONOUR.

224. An acquired honour is surety for more.

HOPE.

225. Hope, deceitful as it is, carries us agreeably through life.

HUMOUR.

226. Our own caprice is more extravagant than the caprice of fortune. 227. Fancy sets the value on the gifts we receive from fortune. 228. Our humour has more faults than our understanding.

229. We may say of men's tempers as of most buildings, that they have several aspects; of which some are agreeable, others disagreeable. 230. The humours of the body have a regular stated course which insensibly influences the will: they circulate together, and successively exercise a secret power over us, so as to have a considerable share in all our actions, tho' we perceive it not. 231. Madmen and fools see every thing through the medium of humour.

232. The calm or disquiet of our tempers depends not so much on affairs of moment, as on the agreeable or disagreeable disposition of the trifles that daily occur.

HYPOCRISY.

233. Hypocrisy is the homage which Vice pays to Virtue.

IDLENESS. See LAZINESS.

JEALOUSY.

234. It is sometimes agreeable to a man to have a

jealous wife; for she is always talking of what pleases him. 235. Only such persons as avoid giving jealousy are deserving of it. 236. Jealousy is always born with love, but does not always die with it. 237. Jealousy is nourished by doubt; and either becomes madness, or ceases, as soon as we arrive at certainty. 238. In Jealousy there is more self-love than love: 239. There is a species of love whose excess prevents jealousy. 240. Jealousy is the greatest of evils, and the least pitied by those who occasion it.

ILLS.

241. Philosophy easily triumphs over past and future ills; but present ills triumph over philosophy. 242. The good we have received from a man should make us bear with the ill he does us. 243. It is less dangerous to do ill to most men, than to do them too much good. 244. A readiness to believe ill without examination is the effect of pride and lazines We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation. 245. Weakness often gets the better of those ills which reason could not.

INCONSTANCY.

246. There is an inconstancy that proceeds from the levity or weakness of the mind, which makes it give into every one's opinions: and there is another inconstancy, more excusable, which arises from satiety.

INGRATITUDE.

247. An extraordinary haste to discharge an obligation is a sort of ingratitude. 248. There are some ungrateful people who are less to be blamed for their ingratitude than their benefactors. 249. We sel-

dom find people ungrateful so long as we are in a condition to serve them. 250. It is no great misfortune to oblige ungrateful people, but an insupportable one to be forced to be under an obligation to a scoundrel.

INFIDELITY.

251. Women in love more easily forgive great indiscretions than small infidelities. 252. Men find it more difficult to overlook the least infidelity to themselves, than the greatest to others.

INNOCENCE.

253 Innocence finds not near so much protection as guilt.

INTEREST.

254. Interest speaks all languages, and acts all parts, even that of disinterestedness itself. 255. Interest, which blinds some people, enlightens others. 256. The name of virtue is as serviceable to interest as vice. 257. Interest puts in motion all the virtues and vices. 258. Good-nature, that boaster of its great sensibility, is often stifled by the smallest interest. 259. We condemn vice, and extol virtue, merely through interest. 260. It is only in little interests that we usually venture to disbelieve appearances.

INTREPIDITY.

261. Intrepidity is an extraordinary strength of the soul, that renders it superior to the trouble, disorder, and emotion, which the appearance of danger is apt to excite. By this quality heroes maintain their tranquillity, and preserve the free use of their reason, in the most surprising and dreadful accidents.

JUDGMENT.

262. Every one complains of his memory, but nobody of his judgment.

JUSTICE.

263. The love of justice, in most men, is only the fear of suffering by injustice.

KNOWLEDGE.

264. To know things well, we should know them in detail; and as that is in a manner infinite, our knowledge is always superficial and imperfect.

LAZINESS.

265. Laziness, timidity, and shame, often keep us within the bounds of duty; while virtue seems to run away with the honour. 266. It is a mistake to imagine, that the violent passions only, such as ambition and love, can triumph over the rest. Laziness, languid as it is, often masters them all; she indeed influences all our designs and actions, and insensibly consumes and destroys both the passions and the virtues. 267. Laziness is more in the mind than in the body.

LIBERALITY.

268. What is called liberality is seldom more than the vanity of giving: we are fonder of the vanity than the generosity of the action.

LOVE.

269. It is difficult to define love: we may say of it, however, that in the soul it is a desire to reign, in minds it is a sympathy, and in bodies a secret inclination to enjoy what we love after many difficulties. 270. No disguise can long conceal love where it is, nor feign it where it is not. 271. Since it is not in our power to love any more than to let it alone, a lover has no right to complain of his mistress's inconstan-

cy, nor she of her lover's levity. 272. To judge of love by most of its effects, one would think it more like hatred than kindness. 273. There are few people who are not ashamed of their amours when the fit is over. 274. There is only one sort of love, but there are a thousand different copies of it.

275. Love, like fire, connot subsist without continual motion; and ceases to exist, as soon as it ceases to hope or fear. 276. Love lends his name to many a correspondence wherein he is no more concerned than the Doge in what is done at Venice. 277. The more we love a mistress, the readier we are to hate her.

278. To love, is the least fault of the woman who has abandoned herself to love. 279. There are people who would never have been in love, if they had never heard talk of it. 280. The pleasure of love is loving; and we are much happier in the passion we feel, than in that we excite. 281. It is much easier to fall in love, than to get rid of it. 282. Novelty is to love what the bloom is to fruit; it gives a lustre which is easily effaced, but never returns. 283. It is impossible to love those a second time whom we have really ceased to love. 284. We forgive, as long as we love. 285 In love, we often doubt of what we most believe. 286. The man who thinks he loves his mistress for her sake, is much mistaking.

287 Young women who would not appear coquets, and old men who would not be ridiculous, should never speak of love as of a thing that in any wise concerns them. 288. A woman keeps her first lover long, if she happens not to take a second. 289. In love, those who are first cured are best cured.

290. All the passions make us commit faults; but love

makes us guilty of the most ridiculous ones.
291. In the old-age of love, as in that of life, we continue to live to pain, tho' we cease to live to pleasure.
292. There are many cures for love; but none of them are infallible. 293. Love, all-agreeable as he is, pleases yet more by the manner in which he shows himself. 294. Lovers never see their mistress's faults till their enchantment is over.

MAGNANIMITY.

295. Magnanimity contemns all, to obtain all.
296. Magnanimity is sufficiently defined, by its name; yet we may say of it, that it is the good-sense of pride, and the noblest way of acquiring applause.
297. To study men is more necessary than to study books. 298. Men and things have their particular point of view: to judge of some, we should see them near: of others we judge best at a distance.
299. The truly honest man is he who valueth not himself on any thing. 300. He must be a truly honest man who is willing to be always open to the inspection of honest men. 301. A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool.

MARRIAGE.

302. There are convenient marriages, but no happy ones.

MEMORY.

303. Why have we memory sufficient to retain the minutest circumstances that have happened to us; and yet not enough to remember how often we have related them to the same person?

MERIT.

304. Those who think themselves persons of merit, often take a pride in being unlucky, in order to make

themselves and others believe that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune. 305. To undeceive a person prejudiced in favour of his merit, is to do him the same bad office that was done to the madman at Athens who fancied all the vessels that came into the port to be his own. 306. It is a sign of an extraordinary merit when those who most envy it are forced to praise it 307. Nature gives merit, and fortune sets it to work. 308. Some people are disgusting with great merit; others with great faults very pleasing. 309. There are people whose whole merit consists in saying and doing foolish things seasonably; and who would spoil all, should they alter their conduct. 310. The art of setting off moderate qualifications steals esteem; and often gives more reputation than real merit. 311. Our merit procures us the esteem of men of sense, and our good fortune that of the public. 312. The world oftener rewards the appearance of merit than merit itself. 313. Merit has its season, as well as fruit. 314. We should not judge of a man's merit by his great qualities but by the use he makes of them. 315. Censorious as the world is, it oftener shews favour to false merit, than it does injustice to true. 316. There are few women whose merit outlives their beauty.

MODERATION.

317. The moderation of happy people is owing to the calm which good forture gives to their temper.

318 Moderation is the dread of incurring that envy and contempt which attend such as are intoxicated by prosperity: it is a vain ostentation of the strength of the mind. Moderation in an exalted station, is the desire of appearing superior to fortune. 319. We

make a virtue of moderation, in order to bound the ambition of great men, and to comfort moderate geniuses for their slender fortune, and their slender merit. 320. Moderation resembles temperance. We would willingly eat more, but are afraid of doing ourselves harm.

NEGOTIATION.

321. The reason of our being often dissatisfied with those who negotiate our affairs is, that they almost always sacrifice the interest of their friends to that of the success of the negotiation; which becomes their own interest, through the honour they expect for bringing to a conclusion what they have undertaken.

OBSTINACY.

322. Narrowness of mind is frequently the cause of obstinacy: we do not easily believe beyond what we see.

OLD-AGE.

323. Old-age gives good advice, when it is no longer able to give bad example. 324. Few people know *how* to be old. 325. Old-age is a tyrant, which forbids the pleasures of youth on pain of death.

OPPORTUNITY.

326. Opportunities make us known to ourselves and others. 327. In affairs of importance, we ought less to endeavour to make opportunities, than to use them when they offer. 328. All our qualities, both good and bad, are uncertain, dubious, and at the mercy of opportunity.

PASSIONS.

329. The duration of our passions is no more in our power than the duration of our lives.

330. Passion often makes a fool of a man of sense:

sometimes it makes a man of sense of a fool.

331. The passions are the only orators that always succeed. They are, as it were, nature's art of eloquence, fraught with infallible rules. Simplicity, with the aid of the passions, persuades more than the utmost eloquence without it. 332. In the heart of man there is a perpetual succession of the passions; so that the destruction of one is almost always the production of another. 333. Passions often beget their opposites: avarice produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice: men are often constant through weakness, and bold through fear. 334. When we subdue our passions, it is rather owing to their weakness than our strength. 335. So much injustice and self-interest enter into the composition of the passions, that it is very dangerous to obey their dictates; and we ought to be on our guard against them even when they seem most reasonable.

336. Notwithstanding all the care we take to conceal our passions under the pretences of religion and honour, they still appear through the flimsy veil.

337. Absence destroys small passions, and encreases great ones; as the wind extinguishes tapers, and kindles fires. 338. We are by no means aware how much we are influenced by our passions. 339. Of all the violent passions, love best becomes a woman.

340. In their first desires women love the lover, afterwards the passion. 341. While the heart is still agitated by the remains of a passion, it is more susceptible of a new one, than when entirely at rest.

342. Those who are, during their lives, under the influence of strong passions are happy; and miserable when cured of them.

PENETRATION.

343. The great fault of penetration is, not the falling short of, but the going beyond, its mark.

344. Penetration has an air of divination, which pleases our vanity more than any other quality of the mind.

PERSEVERENCE.

345. Perseverence merits neither blame nor praise; it is only the duration of our inclinations and sentiments, which we can neither create nor extinguish.

PHILOSOPHERS.

346. The contempt of riches in the philosophers was a concealed desire of revenging on fortune the injustice done to their merit, by despising the good she denied them. It was a secret to shelter them from the ignominy of poverty; a bye-way to arrive at the esteem they could not procure by wealth.

PIETY.

347. The piety of old women is often a decent way of escaping the disgrace and ridicule attendant on decayed beauty; an endeavour to continue themselves on a respectable footing in the world.

PITY.

348. Pity is the sense of our own misfortunes in those of another man: it is a wise foresight of the disasters that may befal us. We assist others in order to engage them to assist us on like occasions: so that the services we render the unfortunate are in reality so many anticipated kindnesses to ourselves.

PLEASING.

349. He who is pleased with nobody, is much more unhappy than he with whom nobody is pleased.

PRIDE.

350. Pride always indemnifies itself; and takes care to be no loser even when it renounces vanity.

351. If we were not proud ourselves, we should not complain of the pride of others. 352. Pride is equal in all men; and differs but in the means and manner of shewing itself. 353. It seems as if nature, who has so wisely adapted the organs of our bodies to our happiness, had with the same view given us pride, to spare us the pain of knowing our imperfections. 354. Pride is more concerned than benevolence in our remonstrances to persons guilty of faults; and we reprove them not so much with a design to amend them, as to make them believe that we ourselves are free from such failings. 355. Pride will not owe, and self-love will not pay. 356. Our pride is often encreased by what we retrench from our other faults. 357. The same pride which makes us condemn the faults we imagine ourselves exempt from, inclines us to despise the good qualities we are not possessed of. 358 There is often more pride than goodness in our concern for the misfortunes of our enemies. We make them feel our superiority, by shewing our compassion. 359. Pride has its caprices as well as other passions: we are ashamed to own that we are jealous; yet value ourselves on having been so, and on being susceptible of it.

PROBITY.

360. It is difficult to determine whether a clear, sincere, and honest procedure, be the effect of probity or artifice.

PROMISES.

361. We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.

PROPERTIES.

362. Most men, like plants, have secret properties, which chance discovers.

PRUDENCE.

363. Prudence and love are inconsistent; in proportion as the last increases, the other decreases.

364. No encomiums are thought too great for prudence; yet cannot it insure the least event.

PRAISE.

365. The shame that arises from praise which we do not deserve, often makes us do things we should never have otherwise attempted. 366. We seldom heartily praise any but those who admire us.

367. We blame ourselves only to extort praise.

368. We never love to praise without a view to self-interest. Praise is an artful, concealed, refined flattery; which pleases very differently the giver and receiver; the one takes it as the reward of his merit, the other gives it to shew his candour and discernment. 369. We often use envenomed praise, which by a side-blow, exposes the person we commend, such faults as we durst not any other way lay open.

370 We seldom praise but to be praised.

371. Few are so wise as to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise. 372. There are reproaches that praise; and praises that reproach. 373. A refusal of praise is a desire to be praised twice. 374. Ambition to merit praise fortifies our virtue. Praise bestowed on wit, valour, and beauty, contributes to their augmentation. 375. That modesty which seems to decline praise, is only the desire of being praised more delicately.

QUALITIES.

376. Our bad actions do not expose us to so much persecution and hatred as our good qualities.

377. It is not enough to have great qualities; we must also have the management of them.

378. There are some good qualities, which, when natural, degenerate into faults; and others which, when acquired, are always imperfect. For example, reason must teach us to be frugal of our fortune and our confidence; and on the contrary, nature must give us benevolence and valour. 379. It is with some good qualities as with the senses; they are incomprehensible and inconceivable to such as are deprived of them.

380. Naturally to be without envy is a certain indication of great qualities. 381. There are bad qualities which constitute great talents.

QUARRELS.

382. Quarrels would never last long, if the fault was on one side only.

RAILLERY.

383. Raillery is more insupportable than wrong; because we have a right to resent injuries, but it is ridiculous to be angry at a jest.

REASON.

384. We are not able to act up to our reason.

385. A man is not rational because chance throws reason in his way: he only is rational who knows, distinguishes, and tastes it. 386. We never desire ardently what we desire rationally.

RECONCILIATION.

387. Reconciliation with our enemies is owing to a desire of bettering our condition, a weariness of war, and an apprehension of some untoward event.

REPENTANCE.

388. Repentance is not so much remorse for what we have done, as the fear of consequences.

REPUTATION.

389. We except to judges in affairs of small moment, but are content that our reputation and glory should be dependent on the judgment of men who are all against us, through jealousy, prejudice, or want of discernment: yet it is merely to engage these to determine in our favour that we often hazard our ease and lives. 390. Whatever ignominy we may have incurred, it is almost always in our power to re-establish our reputation.

RICHES.

391. Many people despise riches, yet few know how to bestow them.

RIDICULE.

392. Ridicule dishonours more than dishonour itself.

SECRETS.

393. How can we expect that another should keep our secrets, when it is more than we can do ourselves?

SELF-LOVE.

394. Self-love is the love of self, and of every thing for the sake of self. Self-love makes men idolize themselves and tyrannize over others, when fortune gives the means. He never rests out of himself; and settles on external things, just as the bee doth on flowers, to extract what may be serviceable. Nothing is so impetuous as his desires, nothing so secret as his designs, nothing so artful as his conduct. His suppleness is inexpressible, his metamorphoses surpass those of Ovid, and his refinements those of chemistry.

We can neither fathom the depth, nor penetrate the obscurity, of his abyss. There concealed from the most piercing eye, he makes numberless turnings and windings: there he is often invisible even to himself: there he conceives, breeds, and brings up (without knowing it) an infinity of likes and dislikes; some of which are so monstrous, that he knows them not when brought into light, or at least cannot prevail on himself to own them. From the night that envelopes him springs the ridiculous notions he entertains of himself: thence his errors, his ignorance, his gross and silly mistakes with respect to himself. Thence it is that he imagines his sensations dead, when they are only asleep; that he thinks he shall never desire to run again when he is once tired; and that he has lost all the appetites he has sated. But this thick darkness, which hides him from himself, hinders him not from seeing perfectly well whatever is without him; in which he resembles the eye, that sees all things except itself. In his great concerns and important affairs, where the violence of desire summoneth his whole attention, he sees, perceives, understands, invents, suspects, penetrates, and divines all things; so that one would be tempted to believe that each passion had, as it were, its respective magic. Nothing is so close and strong as his attachments; which he in vain attempts to break through on discovery of the greatest impending misery. Yet sometimes in a short time he affects, and without trouble, what he had not been able to compass with the greatest efforts, for years. Whence may well be concluded, that it is by himself that his desires are inflamed, more than by the beauty and merit of their objects; that it is his taste that heightens and embel-

REPENTANCE.

388. Repentance is not so much remorse for what we have done, as the fear of consequences.

REPUTATION.

389. We except to judges in affairs of small moment, but are content that our reputation and glory should be dependent on the judgment of men who are all against us, through jealousy, prejudice, or want of discernment: yet it is merely to engage these to determine in our favour that we often hazard our ease and lives. 390. Whatever ignominy we may have incurred, it is almost always in our power to re-establish our reputation.

RICHES.

391. Many people despise riches, yet few know how to bestow them.

RIDICULE.

392. Ridicule dishonours more than dishonour itself.

SECRETS.

393. How can we expect that another should keep our secrets, when it is more than we can do ourselves?

SELF-LOVE.

394. Self-love is the love of self, and of every thing for the sake of self. Self-love makes men idolize themselves and tyrannize over others, when fortune gives the means. He never rests out of himself; and settles on external things, just as the bee doth on flowers, to extract what may be serviceable. Nothing is so impetuous as his desires, nothing so secret as his designs, nothing so artful as his conduct. His suppleness is inexpressible, his metamorphoses surpass those of Ovid, and his refinements those of chemistry.

We can neither fathom the depth, nor penetrate the obscurity, of his abyss. There concealed from the most piercing eye, he makes numberless turnings and windings: there he is often invisible even to himself: there he conceives, breeds, and brings up (without knowing it) an infinity of likes and dislikes; some of which are so monstrous, that he knows them not when brought into light, or at least cannot prevail on himself to own them. From the night that envelopes him springs the ridiculous notions he entertains of himself: thence his errors, his ignorance, his gross and silly mistakes with respect to himself. Thence it is that he imagines his sensations dead, when they are only asleep; that he thinks he shall never desire to run again when he is once tired; and that he has lost all the appetites he has sated. But this thick darkness, which hides him from himself, hinders him not from seeing perfectly well whatever is without him; in which he resembles the eye, that sees all things except itself. In his great concerns and important affairs, where the violence of desire summoneth his whole attention, he sees, perceives, understands, invents, suspects, penetrates, and divines all things; so that one would be tempted to believe that each passion had, as it were, its respective magic. Nothing is so close and strong as his attachments; which he in vain attempts to break through on discovery of the greatest impending misery. Yet sometimes in a short time he affects, and without trouble, what he had not been able to compass with the greatest efforts, for years. Whence may well be concluded, that it is by himself that his desires are inflamed, more than by the beauty and merit of their objects; that it is his taste that heightens and embel-

lishes them; that it is himself that he pursues; and that he follows his inclinations, when he follows things that are agreeable to his inclination. He is composed of contrarieties; he is imperious and obedient, sincere and hypocritical, merciful and cruel, timid and bold. He has different inclinations, according to the different tempers that possess him, and devote him sometimes to glory, sometimes to wealth, sometimes to pleasure. These he changes, as age and experience alter; and it is indifferent to him whether he has many inclinations, or only one: because he can split himself into many, or collect himself into one, as it is convenient or agreeable to him. He is inconstant; and besides those changes that happen from external causes, there are numberless which proceed from himself. He is inconstant through inconstancy, through levity, through love, through novelty, through satiety, through disgust. He is capricious; and sometimes labours with great eagerness and incredible pains to obtain things that are no ways advantageous, nay even hurtful; but which he pursues merely because it is his will. He is whimsical, and often exerts his whole application in the most trifling employments, takes the utmost delight in the most insipid, and preserves all his haughtiness in the most contemptible. He is attendant on all ages and conditions; he lives every where; he lives on every thing; he lives on nothing. He makes himself easy either in the enjoyment, or privation of things; he even goes over to those who are at variance with him; he enters into their schemes, and, which is wonderful! hates himself with them; he conspires his own destruction; he labours to undo himself; he only desires to BE; and, that granted, he consents to be his

own enemy. We must not therefore be surprised if he sometimes closes with the most rigid austerity; and enters boldly into a combination therewith to ruin himself; because what he loses in one place he regains in another. When we think he relinquishes his pleasures, he but suspends, or changes them; and even when he is discomfited, and we think we are rid of him, we find him triumphant in his own defeat. Such is self-love! of which man's life is only a long and great agitation. The sea is its representative; in the flux and reflux of whose waves, self-love may find a lively expression of the turbulent succession of its thoughts, and of its eternal motion. 395. The first impulse of joy we feel from the good fortune of a friend proceeds neither from our good-nature, nor friendship; but is the effect of self-love, which flatters us either with the hope of being happy in our turn, or of making some advantage of his prosperity.

396. Self-love is the greatest of flatterers. 397. Self-love, well or ill conducted, constitutes virtue and vice.

398. Human prudence, rightly understood, is circumspect enlightened self-love. 399. We are so prepossessed in our own favour, that we often mistake for virtues those vices that have some resemblance to them, and which are artfully disguised by self-love.

400. Notwithstanding all the discoveries that have been made in the country of self-love, there still remains much *terra incognita*. 401. Self-love is more artful than the most artful of men. 402. The fondness, or indifference, of the old philosophers for life, was only a taste of their self-love; which ought no more to be controverted than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colours. 403. Nothing is so capa-

ble of diminishing our self-love, as the observation that we disapprove at one time of what we approve at another. 404. There is no passion in which self-love reigns so absolutely as in love: we are always ready to sacrifice the peace of those we love, rather than lose the least part of our own. 405. The self-love of some people is such, that, when in love, they are more taken up with their passion, than its object.

SENSATIONS.

406. It is more difficult to conceal the sensations we have, than to feign those we have not.

SILENCE.

407. Silence is the safest course a man can take who is diffident of himself.

SIMPLICITY.

408. Affected simplicity is refined imposture.

SINCERITY.

409. Sincerity is an openness of heart which is rarely to be found. That which commonly personates it, is a refined dissimulation, whose end is to procure confidence. 410. A desire to talk of ourselves, and to set our faults in whatever light we chuse, makes the main of our sincerity.

SLANDER.

411. We commonly slander more through vanity than malice.

SOBRIETY.

412. Sobriety is either the love of health, or an incapacity for debauch.

SOCIETY.

413. Men would not live long in society, if they were not the mutual dupes of each other.

SOUL.

414. The health of the soul is as precarious as that of the body; for when we seem secure from passions, we are no less in danger of their infection, than we are of falling ill, when we appear to be well.

415. There are relapses in the distempers of the soul, as well as in those of the body. Thus we often mistake for a cure, what is no more than an intermission, or a change of disease. 416. The flaws of the soul resemble the wounds of the body; let them be ever so skilfully healed, the scar always appears, and they are in danger of breaking open again.

SUBTILTY.

417. Too great subtilty is false delicacy; and true delicacy is solid subtilty.

TALKATIVENESS.

418. We speak little when vanity does not prompt us. 419. We had rather speak ill of ourselves than not speak at all. 420. As it is the characteristic of great wits to say much in few words, so small wits seem to have the gift of speaking much and saying nothing. 421. The excessive pleasure we feel in talking of ourselves, ought to make us apprehensive that it gives but little to our auditors. 422. We know that we should not talk of our wives; but we seem not to know that we should talk still less of ourselves. 423. It is never more difficult to speak well than when we are ashamed of our silence.

TASTE.

424. It is as common for men to change their taste, as it is uncommon for them to change their inclina-

tion. 425. A good taste is more the effect of judgment than of understanding. 426. We give up our interest sooner than our taste. 427. Our taste declines with our merit. 428. Our self-love bears with less patience the condemnation of our taste than of our opinion.

TIMIDITY.

429. Timidity is a fault dangerous to reprehend in those we would reform.

TITLES.

430. Titles, instead of exalting, debase those who do not act up to them.

TREACHERY.

431. Men are oftener treacherous through weakness than design.

TRUTH.

432. Truth is not so beneficial to men as its appearances are prejudicial. 433. Our enemies, in their judgment of us, come nearer the truth than we do ourselves.

VALOUR.

434. The love of glory, the fear of shame, the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering life easy and agreeable, and the humour of pulling down other people, are often the causes of that valour so celebrated among men. 435. Valour in private soldiers is a dangerous trade taken up to get a livelihood.

436. Perfect valour and perfect cowardice are extremes men seldom arrive at. The intermediate space is prodigious, and contains all the different species of courage, which are as various as men's faces and humours. There are those who expose themselves boldly at the beginning of an action; and who slacken and

are disheartened at its duration. There are others who aim only at preserving their honour, and do little more. Some are not equally exempt from fear at all times. Others give occasionally into a general panic: others advance to the charge because they dare not stay in their posts. There are men whom habitual small dangers encourage and qualify for greater. Some are brave with the sword, and fear bullets: others defy bullets, and dread a sword. All these different kinds of valour agree in this, that night, as it augments fear, so it conceals good or bad actions, and gives every one the opportunity of sparing himself. There is also another more general discretion: for we find that the man who does most, would do more still, if he were sure of coming off safe: so that it is very plain that the fear of death gives a damp to valour. 437. Perfect valour consists in doing without witnesses all we should be capable of doing before the whole world. 438. Most men sufficiently expose themselves in war, to save their honour; but few so much as is necessary even to succeed in the design for which they thus expose themselves. 439. No man can answer for his courage who has never been in danger.

VANITY.

440. If vanity does not overturn the virtues, it certainly makes them totter. 441. It is our own vanity which makes the vanity of others intolerable. 442. The most violent passions have their intermissions; vanity alone gives us no respite. 443. The reason why the pangs of shame and jealousy are so sharp is, that vanity can give us no assistance in supporting them. 444. Vanity makes us do more things against inclination than reason.

VICE.

445. When our vices have left us, we flatter ourselves that we have left them. 446. Vices enter into the composition of virtues, as poisons into the composition of medicines. These prudence mixes and tempers, and makes good use of the compound against the ills of life. 447. The reason we are not often wholly possessed by a single vice is, that we are distracted by several.

VIOLENCE.

448. The violence done us by others, is often less painful than that we do to ourselves. 449. The violence we do ourselves, in order to prevent love, is often more rigorous than the cruelty of a mistress.

VIRTUE.

450. Our virtues are commonly disguised vices.
451. What we mistake for virtue is often no more than a concurrence of divers actions and interests which fortune, or industry, disposes to advantage. It is not always from the principles of valour and chastity that men are valiant and women chaste. 452. Prosperity is a stronger trial of virtue than adversity.
453. The virtues are lost in interest as rivers are in the sea. 454. It must be acknowledged to the honour of virtue, that the greatest misfortunes which befal men are owing to their vices. 455. We do not despise all those who have vices; but we despise all those who have no virtues. 456. Nature seems to have prescribed to every man at his birth the bounds both of his virtues and vices. 457. Virtue would not go so far if vanity did not bear her company.
458. Men dare not, as bad as they are, appear open

enemies to virtue; when therefore they persecute virtue they pretend to think it counterfeit, or else lay some crime to its charge.

VOGUE.

459. There are people, who, like new songs, are in vogue only for a time.

WEAKNESS.

460. Weakness is the only incorrigible fault men have. 461. Weakness is more opposite to virtue than is vice itself. 462. Weak people are incapable of sincerity. 463. More men are guilty of treason through weakness, than any studied design to betray. 464 If there are men whose weak side has not been discovered it is only because it has never been accurately sought after.

UNTRUTH.

465. Our aversion to untruth is often but an imperceptible ambition to make our testimony considerable, and to give our words a religious weight.

WEARINESS.

466 The reason why lovers are never weary of one another is, that they are always talking of themselves. 467. We often boast that we are never out of spirits, and yet are too conceited to own that we are not bad company. 468. We often forgive those who tire us, but we cannot forgive those whom we tire. 469 We are almost always tired with the company of those very persons of whom we ought never to be tired.

WILL.

470 We have more power than will; and it is only to disculpate us to ourselves, that we often think things impracticable.

WISDOM.

471. Man's chief wisdom consists in knowing his follies. 472. It is easier to be wise for others than for ourselves. 473. Our wisdom is no less at Fortune's mercy than our wealth. 474. Wisdom is to the mind what health is to the body. 475. A wise man had rather avoid an engagement than conquer.

WIT, OR UNDERSTANDING.

476. Those are mistaking who imagine wit and judgment to be two distinct things. Judgment is only the perfection of wit, which penetrates into the recesses of things, observes all that merits observation, and perceives what seems imperceptible. We must therefore agree, that it is extensive wit which produces all the effects attributed to judgment. 477. Strength and weakness of mind are improper terms; they are in reality only the good or ill disposition of the organs of the body. 478. It is a common fault to be never satisfied with our fortune, nor dissatisfied with our understanding. 479. Politeness of mind consists in thinking genteely and delicately. 480. The gallantry of the mind consists in flattering agreeably. 481. It often happens that things present themselves to our minds more finished than we could make them with much labour. 482. The defects of the mind, like those of the face, grow worse as we grow old. 483. A man of wit would be often at a loss, were it not for the company of fools. 484. It is better to employ our understanding in bearing the misfortunes that actually befal us, than in penetrating into those that may. 485. It is not so much through a fertility of invention that we find many expedients in

any one affair, as through a poverty of judgment, which makes us listen to every thing that imagination presents and hinders us from discerning at first what is best. 486. Those who have but one sort of wit are sure not to please long. 487. Wit sometimes enables us to commit bold follies. 488. A man of sense finds less difficulty in submitting to a wrong headed fellow than in attempting to set him right. 489. The mind, between idleness and constancy, fixes on what is easy or agreeable to it. This habit always sets bounds to our enquiries: no man ever gave himself the trouble to extend and carry his genius as far as it was capable of going. 490. Vivacity, when it encreases with age, is not far short of frenzy. 491. The labours of the body free men from pains of the mind; and this it is that constitutes the happiness of the poor. 492. Small geniuses are hurt by small events; great geniuses see through and despise them.

WOMAN.

493. Women affect coyness as an addition to their beauty. 494. The virtue of women is often the love of reputation and quiet. 495. Women often think they are in love, when they are not. The amusement of an intrigue, the emotion of mind produced by gallantry, their natural passion for being beloved, and their unwillingness to give a denial; all these make them imagine they are in love, when in fact they are only coquetting. 496. Women are never completely cruel but to those they hate. 497. The wit of most women serves rather to fortify their folly than their reason. 498. There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession. 499. Most virtuous women, like hidden treasures, are secure be-

cause nobody seeks after them. 500. The common foible of women who *have been* handsome is to forget that they are no longer so. 501. Most women yield more through weakness than passion; whence it happens that enterprizing rather than amiable men commonly succeed best with them. 502. That woman is much to be pitied who at once possesses both love and virtue.

YOUTH.

503. Youth changes its inclinations through heat of blood; old-age perseveres in them through habit. 504. Youth is continual intoxication: it is the fever of reason. 505. Youth without beauty is of as little consequence, as beauty without youth. 506 Young people at their entrance into the world should be either bashful or giddy; a composed self-sufficiency generally turns to impertinence.

CONTENTS.

Ability, page 1.
Accent, 1.
Accidents, 1.
Actions, 1.
Advice, 2.
Affectation, 3.
Affliction, 3.
Age, 4.
Agreeableness, 4.
Ambition, 4.
Appearance, 5.
Application, 5.
Avarice, 5.
Benefits, 6.
Business, 6.
Civility, 6.
Clemency, 6.
Conduct, 6.
Confidence, 7.
Constancy, 7.
Contempt, 8.
Conversation, 8.
Copies, 8.
Coquetry, 8.
Crimes, 9.
Cunning, 9.
Curiosity, 10.
Death, 10.
Deceit, 12.
Decency, 13.
Desire, 13.
Disguise, 13.
Distrust, 14.
Ease, 14.
Education, 14.
Eloquence, 14.
Employment, 14.
Envy, 14.
Example, 15.
Familiarity, 15.
Favourites, 15.
Faults, 15.
Fear, 17.
Fidelity, 17.
Flattery, 17.
Folly, 17.
Fortune, 17.
Friendship, 18.
Gallantry, 20.
Glory, 20.
Goodness, 20.
Good-sense, 21.
Govern, 21.
Grace, 21.
Gratitude, 22.
Gravity, 21.
Great men, 21.
Greediness, 21.
Happiness, 22.
Hatred, 22.
Heart, 22.
Heroes, 23.
Honour, 23.
Hope, 23.
Humour, 23.
Hypocrisy, 23.
Idleness. See Laziness.
Ill[illegible], 24.
I[illegible]stancy, 24.
I[illegible]ity, 25
Ingratitude, 24.
Innocence, 25.
Interest, 25.
Intrepidity, 25.
Jealousy, 23.
Judgment, 26.
Justice, 26.
Knowledge, 26.
Laziness, 26.
Liberality, 26.
Love, 26.
Magnanimity, 28.
Marriage, 28.
Memory, 28.
Merit. 28.
Moderation, 29.
Negotiation, 30.
Obstinacy, 30.
Old-age, 30.
Opportunity, 30.
Passions, 30.
Penetration, 32.
Perseverance, 32.
Philosophers, 32.
Piety, 32.
Pity, 32.
Pleasing, 33.
Probity, 33.
Pride, 33.
Promises, 33.
Properties, 34.
Praise, 34.
Prudence, 34.
Qualities, 35.
Quarrels, 35.
Raillery, 35.
Reason, 35.
Reconciliation, 35.
Repentance, 36.
Reputation, 36.
Riches, 36.
Ridicule, 36.
Secrets, 36.
Self-love, 36.
Sensations, 40.
Silence, 40.
Simplicity, 40.
Sincerity, 40.
Slander, 40.
Sobriety, 40.
Society, 40.
Soul, 41.
Subtilty, 41.
Talkativeness, 41.
Taste, 41.
Timidity, 42.
Titles, 42.
Treachery, 42.
Truth, 42.
Valour, 42.
Vanity, 43.
Vice, 44.
Violence, 44.
Virtue, 44.
Vogue, 45.
Untruth, 45.
Weakness, 45.
Weariness, 45.
Will, 45.
Wisdom, 46.
Wit; 46.
Woman, 47.
Youth, 48.